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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a general operating scheme
which allows the utility company to jointly perform power
procurement and demand response so as to maximize the social
welfare. Our model takes into consideration the effect of the
renewable energy and the multi-stage feature of the power pro-
curement process. It also enables the utility company to provide
quality-of-usage (QoU) guarantee to the power consumers, which
ensures that the average power usage level meets the target value
for each user. To maximize the social welfare, we develop a low-
complexity algorithm called the welfare maximization algorithm
(WMA), which performs joint power procurement and dynamic
pricing. WMA is constructed based on a two-timescale Lyapunov
optimization technique. We prove that WMA achieves a close-
to-optimal utility and ensures that the QoU requirement is
met with bounded deficit. WMA can be implemented in a
distributed manner and is robust with respect to system dynamics
uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed enormous efforts to modernize
the power grid. Central to this challenging task are the inte-
gration of renewable energy technologies [1] and the design
of efficient user demand-response schemes [2]. In this paper,
we propose a general operating scheme which allows the util-
ity companies to optimally integrate the available renewable
energy sources to maximize the social welfare, and to perform
optimal demand response to ensure the users’ quality-of-usage
(QoU).
Specifically, we consider a utility company, equipped with
a renewable energy source, purchasing power from a two-
stage electricity market to meet the users’ demand. Every
day, the utility company first purchases power from the day-
ahead market for the next day, called the base-power, based
on its forecast of the user demand and the available renewable
energy. Then, if the base-power and the renewable power are
enough to meet the user demand on the next day, no further
action is needed; otherwise, the utility company purchases
additional power from the real-time market to meet the power
deficit, which incurs an extra cost. Besides performing power
procurement, the utility company also adjusts its electricity
selling prices to encourage the users to shift their deferrable
loads to times when the prices in the market are low. At
the same time, the utility company also has to ensure the
users’ quality-of-usage (QoU), i.e., the average user power
consumption level exceeds a pre-agreed level. The objective of
the utility company is to optimally perform power procurement
and determine the electricity prices, so as to maximize the
social welfare, i.e., aggregate user utility minus the cost for
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supporting the user loads, subject to guaranteeing the users’
QoU.
There have been many previous works on integrating
renewable energy into the power grid, designing optimal
power procurement algorithms, and constructing demand re-
sponse schemes. [3] proposes the concept of “risk-limiting-
dispatching” as a way of incorporating renewable energy into
the current power grid. Works [4] and [5] consider the problem
of selling wind power in the current electricity market. [6]
designs contract schemes to best commercialize renewable
energy for the electricity market. On the power procurement
side, [7] and [8] consider the problem of optimally procuring
power to maximize the social welfare for a single day under
both independent and time-correlated demand conditions, us-
ing stochastic subgradient methods. [9] considers the problem
of minimizing the expected power cost and formulates the
problem as a Markov decision problem. [10] considers the
problem of optimally utilizing the renewable energy for both
cost minimization and revenue maximization. [11] formulates
the optimal power dispatch problem as a Markov decision
problem. On the demand response side, [12] and [13] for-
mulate the problem of optimal demand response as convex
programs and study the role of dynamic pricing. [14] uses
a game theoretic approach to study the demand management
problem. However, we note that most of the previous works (a)
either consider the three problems separately, in which case the
resulting algorithm may not be optimal for the entire system,
or (b) do not consider the multi-stage nature of the power
procurement process, which makes the solution less applicable
to the power grid, or (c) only consider optimizing the system
for a single period, in which case finding the optimal solution
relies heavily on the convexity assumptions of the user utility
functions.
In this paper, we consider the problem of jointly optimizing
power procurement and demand response to maximize the
long term average social welfare. Our model fully accounts
for the multi-stage nature of the electricity market and allows
the user utility functions to be arbitrary increasing functions.
Our algorithm design approach uses a two-stage Lyapunov
optimization technique, which allows us to develop low-
complexity optimal control algorithms. The main contributions
of the paper are summarized as follows:
• A general operating scheme for utility companies to
jointly optimize power procurement and demand response
to maximize the long term system welfares and ensure the
users’ quality-of-usage (QoU).
• The optimal power procurement scheme for utility com-
panies to maximize the gain of renewable energy sources.
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2Explicitly quantified the value of renewable energy to the
system, and the effects of its mean and variance on the
gain.
• Characterization of the social welfare loss due to the
constraint that all users must see the same price.
• A low-complexity online control algorithm welfare max-
imization algorithm (WMA), which fully accounts for
the multi-stage nature of the electricity market, and is
provably near-optimal for maximizing the social welfare
while ensuring that the users’ QoU are met with bounded
deficit for all times.
• An evaluation of our scheme using real-world renewable
energy and market power prices data, and a demonstration
that it effectively maximizes the social welfare.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
our system model. In Section III, we present our algorithm
design approach and construct the welfare maximization al-
gorithm (WMA) to jointly optimize power procurement and
pricing. We then analyze our scheme in Section IV. Numerical
results are presented in Section V. We conclude our paper in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system shown in Fig. 1. In the system, the
utility company is supplying power to N users. Time is divided
into days, and each day is further divided into T equal size
slots that correspond, e.g., to one-hour l or 15-minute intervals.
Users
1, …, N utility
Buying p(t)
Market
Day-ahead β(t)
Real-time α(t)
Load L(p(t))
Day k -1 time
Day-ahead 
planning for k
Real-time purchasing
Day k 
(a) System Model
(b) Frame structure
Renewable X(t)
Fig. 1. (a) The system model. (b) The time structure.
A. Power procurement model
We assume that the utility company has a renewable energy
source and denote the renewable power it obtains in slot t on
day k by X(k, t). This renewable energy source can be solar
panels or wind turbines owned by the utility company. We
assume that X(k, t) d= X(t) for some random variable X(t)
and are i.i.d. every day. 1 Here “ d=” represents “equal in distri-
bution.” We denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) of
X(t) by fX(x, t), and compactly write the renewable energy
as X(t) in the following. We denote the maximum capacity
1This assumption can be viewed as ignoring the potential time dependence
of X(k, t) on k, e.g., the seasonal behavior change of wind power. However,
our results can be extended to incorporate such dependence on k.
of the renewable energy by xmax, so that X(t) ≤ xmax with
probability one.
To serve the users, the utility company operates according
to the following procedure. 2
Demand response: On day k − 1, the utility company
first chooses the power price vector p(k) = (p(k, t), t =
0, 1, ..., T − 1) for day k from some feasible price set P , and
announces the prices. We assume that the feasible price set P
is a time-invariant and compact subset of RT , which includes
the constraint 0 ≤ p(k, t) ≤ pmax for all k, t. For instance,
one example is P = [0, pmax]T .
Day-ahead planning: On day k − 1, the utility company
first forecasts the aggregate user demand L(k, t) based on its
knowledge of the users’ responses to the prices. We assume
that the utility company can accurately forecast L(k, t), in-
cluding its mean and the distribution of the randomness. 3
To efficiently utilize the renewable energy, the utility com-
pany also forecasts the available renewable energy X(t) on
day k based on fX(x, t). Then, it procures a base-power
B(k, t) from the day-ahead market based on the estimated
load L(k, t) and renewable energy X(t), at a price β(k, t).
Real-time purchasing: At time t on day k, if the procured
power and the renewable energy are enough to meet the
demand, i.e., B(k, t) + X(t) ≥ L(k, t), no further action
is needed. Otherwise, the utility company has to purchase
additional power from the real-time market with a real-time
price α(k, t) to meet the power deficit Y (k, t) , L(k, t) −
B(k, t)−X(t).
In the above steps, we assume that when purchasing
power from the electricity market on day k − 1, the util-
ity company can observe the day-ahead price β(k, t) and
the expected real-time α¯(k, t). In practice, the day-ahead
and real-time prices are time-varying. To model this as-
pect, we denote β(k) = (β(k, 1), ..., β(k, T )) and α¯(k) =
(E
[
α(k, 1)
]
, ...,E
[
α(k, T )
]
), the market price vector pair. We
then first assume that on each day, the pair (β(k), α¯(k))
is drawn i.i.d. from some finite market price set Pm =
{(βj , α¯j), j = 1, ...,M} according to some distribution which
may not be known to the utility company. We will later extend
our results to the case when the vector evolves according to
some finite state Markovian process. Finally, we assume that
both the day-ahead and real-time prices are upper bounded,
i.e., 0 ≤ α(k, t) ≤ αmax and 0 ≤ β(k, t) ≤ βmax, and denote
δmax , max[αmax, βmax].
B. User demand model
We assume that each user derives a utility Un(k, t) =
Un(L, t) at time t on day k by consuming a load of Lminn (t) ≤
L ≤ Lmaxn , where Lminn (t) is the minimum amount of load that
user n must consume at time t, e.g., lighting at night. 4 Each
2In practice, there will be ancillary services in addition to the two stages
considered here. Our model can be extended to incorporate these components.
3Note that this is not very restrictive and can be done when the user utility
functions are known. Even in the case when they are not known, the utility
company can still predict with empirical data.
4Our results readily extend to the case when U(·, ·) is also a function of
k, in which case each day has different utility functions for each time.
3utility function Un(L, t) is only assumed to be an increasing
and continuous function of L.
Upon receiving the prices for day k, each user first plans
an intended power consumption level Ldn(k, t) for each time t
(the choice of Ldn(k, t) will be specified later). However, the
actual power consumption on day k may not be exactly equal
to Ldn(k, t). We model this effect by assuming that the actual
consumption is equal to Ln(k, t) = Ldn(k, t) + wn(k, t) for
some i.i.d. zero mean random variable wn(k, t). We assume
that wn(k, t)
d
= wn(t) for some random variable wn(t) ≤
wmaxn for all time. We denote the p.d.f. of wn(t) by fwn(t)
and assume that wn(t) +Ldn(k, t) ≥ Lminn (t) for all times, and
that wn(t) is independent of the renewable energy X(t). 5
Each user determines his intended consumption by solving
the following maximization problem, where the expectation is
taken over wn(k, t):
Ldn(k, t) = min arg max
Lminn (t)≤L≤Ld, maxn
E
[
Un(L+ wn(k, t), t) (1)
−p(k, t)(L+ wn(k, t))
]
.
Here Ld, maxn = L
max
n − wmaxn is the maximum planned
consumption level. That is, the user picks his load to minimize
the expected utility minus cost. In the case when there are
multiple choices, he picks the load with minimum magnitude.
Therefore, the price vector uniquely determines the loads of
the users. We also notice that, since Un(L, t) is a function
of a single variable L, the maximization problem of user n
can usually be efficiently solved with high accuracy, even if
Un(L, t) is nonconcave.
In practice, besides maximizing his utility via power con-
sumption every time slot, each user also has a requirement
on the average power usage level. To model this aspect, we
assume that each user n has the following quality-of-usage
(QoU) requirement: 6
lim inf
K→∞
1
KT
K−1∑
k=0
T−1∑
t=0
E
[
Ln(k, t)
] ≥ Lavn . (2)
Note that Lavn can also be viewed as measuring the willingness
of user n to perform load shifting: a smaller Lavn repre-
sents less stringent QoU requirement, and the user is more
willing to defer his load. The constraint (2) can be viewed
as an approximate version of the more stringent constraint∑T−1
t=0 Ln(k, t) ≥ TLavn for each frame k, which inevitably
requires dynamic-programming as the solution technique [7].
As we will see later, (2) allows us to approximately solve the
harder constraint with a much simpler online algorithm.
Finally, to model the user heterogeneity, we assume that
there exists a positive constant γ ≥ 1 such that: for any given
price p(k, t) and for any user pair n and m, the intended
consumptions are bounded by each other:
Ldn(k, t) ≤ γLdm(k, t), Ldm(k, t) ≤ γLdn(k, t). (3)
5Note that in practice, user n’s power consumption may well be correlated
with the renewable energy level. This effect is captured by the utility function
Un(L, t) in our formulation.
6In our problem, this condition can be shown to be equivalent to requiring
that the constraint holds with probability 1 when the limit is well defined.
When γ = 1, all the users are homogeneous; whereas if
γ = ∞, the users can be highly heterogeneous. Now by
defining w(t) ,
∑
n wn(t) and L
d(k, t) ,
∑
n L
d
n(k, t) to
be the random and deterministic components of the load, the
aggregate load can be expressed as:
L(k, t) = Ld(k, t) + w(k, t). (4)
C. Utility company objective
On day k, the cost for the utility company at time t is given
by:
Cost(k, t) , β(k, t)B(k, t) + α(k, t)Y (k, t), (5)
where Y (k, t) =
[
L(k, t) − B(k, t) − X(t)]+ denotes the
power deficit at time t. The welfare obtained by the utility
company-user system on day k is given by:
Welfare(k) ,
T−1∑
t=0
[ N∑
n=1
Un(Ln(k, t), t)− Cost(k, t)
]
. (6)
Now for any feasibly power procurement and dynamic pricing
policy Π, its expected average social welfare is defined:
WelfareΠav , lim inf
K→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
E
[
WelfareΠ(k)
]
. (7)
Here the expectation is taken over the random renewable
energy X(t), the random market prices and wn(t) for each
user.
Below, we define Welfare∗av to be the optimal average wel-
fare over all feasible policies that ensure the QoU constraint
(2). The objective of the utility company is to find an optimal
dynamic pricing and power procurement policy to maximize
(7) subject to (2). In the following, we refer to this problem
as the Welfare Maximization Problem (WMP). To ensure the
existence of at least one optimal feasible control policy, we
assume that:
Lavn > max
0≤t≤T−1
Lminn (t), L
d, max
n ≥ Lavn + wmaxn , ∀n. (8)
Note that the constraints in (8) simply say that the QoU level
of each user is no less than the minimum requirement and is
no more than the maximum consumption. We also assume that
both the renewable energy X(t) and the load randomnesses
wn(t) are continuous random variables.
III. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we construct algorithms to solve the WMP
problem. Our solution is based on the Lyapunov network op-
timization technique [15] and requires minimum information
of the random dynamics in the system. To carry out our
construction, we first present in Section III-A the optimal
base-power procurement component of our algorithm, which
maximizes the gain brought about to the utility company by
the renewable energy. This result is not only interesting of its
own, but also enables us to convert the Welfare(k) function
into a function only of the user prices p(k, t), which facilitates
the design of the dynamic response algorithm in Section III-B.
A. Optimal base-power procurement
In this section, we study how the utility company can
maximize the gain of the renewable energy. To do so, we first
4define:
Z(t) , X(t)− w(t), (9)
as the “effective” random renewable energy, and use fZ(z, t)
and FZ(z, t) to denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of Z(t). We also
use F−1Z (a, t) to denote the inverse c.d.f. function of Z(t),
i.e.,
F−1Z (a, t) = inf{z : FZ(z, t) = a}. (10)
We now state the following lemma, which gives the optimal
power procurement scheme for the utility company to mini-
mize its expected cost for meeting a load L(k, t) at time t on
day k.
Lemma 1: The optimal base-power B∗(k, t) is given by:
B∗(k, t) =

0, if α¯(k,t)β(k,t) < 1[
Ld(k, t)− F−1Z (β(k,t)α¯(k,t) , t)
]+
, else.
(11)
When B∗(k, t) = 0, we have:
E
[
Cost∗(k, t)
]
= α¯(k, t)E
[
(Ld(k, t)− Z(t))+]. (12)
Else. if B∗(k, t) > 0, we have:
E
[
Cost∗(k, t)
]
= β(k, t)Ld(k, t)
−α¯(k, t)
∫ F−1Z ( β(k,t)α¯(k,t) ,t)
−∞
zfZ(z, t)dz. (13)
Moreover, E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
is non-decreasing in Ldn(k, t). 3
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that the second term on the right-hand-side (RHS) in
(13) can indeed be interpreted as the value of the renewable
energy X(t) (denoted as VoR(t)) (without X(t), the minimum
expected cost is β(k, t)Ld(k, t)), i.e.,
VoR(t) = α¯(k, t)
∫ F−1Z ( β(k,t)α¯(k,t) ,t)
−∞
zfZ(z, t)dz. (14)
The following corollary follows from Lemma 1 and shows that
the value of the renewable energy is increasing with its mean
and non-increasing with its variance.
Lemma 2: The value of renewable energy VoR(t) is in-
creasing with the mean of X(t) and nondecreasing with the
variance of X(t).
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. The Lyapunov approach
We now present the construction of the joint pricing-power
procurement algorithm using the Lyapunov technique. The
method works as follows: we first define a set of “deficit”
queues for each of the constraints we want to guarantee, i.e.,
(2). Then, using the queueing dynamics (defined later), we ob-
tain a drift inequality, which captures how the actions at every
time affect the system welfare and the deficit queue sizes.
After that, we construct our algorithm by finding our actions
to minimize RHS of the drift inequality, which corresponds to
finding the “descent” direction for the system state. By doing
so at every time slot, we can guarantee that the average welfare
is maximized. Also, although we start with the time average
constraint (2), we can get as a by-product of our algorithm
an explicit sample-path deficit queueing bound. This provides
explicit delay guarantee for the deferred loads of the users,
and is very useful in practice.
To start, we define a load-deficit queue Qn(τ), τ = 0, 1, ...
for each user n as follows: Qn(0) = 0, and it evolves
according to:
Qn(tk + t+ 1) = [Qn(tk + t)− Ln(k, t)]+ + Lavn , (15)
for all k and all t. Here tk , kT is introduced for notation
simplicity. The intuition behind the deficit queue is that, if we
can guarantee Qn(t)/t→ 0, then (2) will be ensured. To see
this, note from (15) that:
Qn(τ + 1) ≥ Qn(τ)− Ln(τ) + Lavn . (16)
Here τ = tk + t. Taking expectations on both sides and
summing it up from τ = 0, ...r − 1, we get:
E
[
Qn(r)
] ≥ E[Qn(0)]− r−1∑
τ=0
E
[
Ln(τ)
]
+ rLavn . (17)
Dividing both sides by r, and taking the liminf as r →∞, we
see that (2) follows.
Now to make use of the deficit queues, we define a Lya-
punov function V (τ) , 12
∑N
n=1Q
2(τ) and denote Q(τ) =
(Qn(τ), n = 1, ..., N). We then define the following T -slot
Lyapunov drift for every time tk = kT :
∆(tk) = E
[
V (tk+1)− V (tk) | Q(tk)
]
. (18)
Here the expectation is taken over the randomness of the re-
newable energy and the potentially random power procurement
and pricing action selections.
We now proceed to construct our algorithm. We first have
the following lemma regarding the drift defined in (18).
Lemma 3: For any value k = 0, 1, ..., we have:
∆(tk) ≤ CT
−
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
] | Q(tk)]. (19)
Here C = 12
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
. 3
Proof: See Appendix C.
To construct our algorithm, we choose a parameter  > 0,
which represents how close we want our performance to be to
the optimal value. We then define η , 1/ and substract from
both sides of (19) the term ηE
[
Welfare(k) | Q(tk)
]
to get:
∆(tk)− ηE
[
Welfare(k) | Q(tk)
]
≤ CT − ηE
[
Welfare(k) | Q(tk)
]
−
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
] | Q(tk)].
Now we plug in the definition of Welfare(k) in (6) to get:
∆(tk)− ηE
[
Welfare(k) | Q(tk)
]
≤ CT − η
T−1∑
t=0
E
[ N∑
n=1
Un(Ln(k, t), t)− Cost(k, t) | Q(tk)
]
5−
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
] | Q(tk)]. (20)
We can now construct our algorithm by choosing the actions
that minimize the RHS of (20). However, directly doing so will
require solving the following dynamic programming problem:
Φ(p(k)) , max :
T−1∑
t=0
E
[ N∑
n=1
ηUn(Ln(k, t), t)− ηCost(k, t)
+
∑
n
Qn(tk + t)L
d
n(p(k, t), t) | Q(tk)
]
s.t. p(k) ∈ P. (21)
Here p(k) = (p(k, t), t = 0, ..., T − 1) is the price vector of
day k, and P is the set of feasible prices defined in Section
II.
Therefore, we instead use an alternative method to approx-
imately solve this dynamic programming problem, in which
case our actions approximately minimize the RHS of (20).
The intuition behind our approach is that, since the queue
sizes will only change by a finite amount in any slot, instead
of using the exact deficit queue value in very time slot, we
use the “less updated” information Q(tk). By doing so, we
can still approximately minimize the RHS of (20). However,
this approximation not only enables us to decouple the pricing
decisions across time slots, which greatly reduces the com-
putational complexity of our algorithm, but also allows us to
solve the pricing problem ((23) defined below) in a distributed
manner using using the “consistency price” approach in [16] in
a distributed manner without the users submitting their utility
functions to the utility company. This makes our algorithm
very suitable for practical implementation.
Below, for the ease of presentation, we denote both Ln(k, t)
and Un(L, t) as random functions of the price for convenience:
Ldn(k, t) = L
d
n(p(k, t), t), Un(L, t) = Un(p(k, t), t). (22)
Welfare Maximization Algorithm (WMA):
• On Day k − 1: the utility company performs pricing and
and the users perform consumption planning for day k:
– Utility-Company-Pricing: Based on its knowledge of
the user demand, the utility company chooses the
price p(k, t) for time tk + t, so as to maximize:
ΦA(p(k, t)) , max : E
[ N∑
n=1
ηUn(p(k, t), t)− ηCost(k, t)
+
∑
n
Qn(tk)L
d
n(p(k, t), t) | Q(tk)
]
s.t. p(k) ∈ P. (23)
– Utility-Company-Day-Ahead-Power-Procurement:
Observe (β(k), α¯(k)), procure base-power B(k, t)
according to (11) using knowledge of L(k, t) and
Z(t) = X(t)− w(t).
– User-Consumption-Planning: Choose the load
Ldn(k, t) according to (1), i.e.,
Ldn(k, t) = min arg max
Lminn (t)≤L≤Ld, maxn
E
[
Un(L+ wn(k, t), t) (24)
−p(k, t)(L+ wn(k, t))
]
.
• On Day k: The user consumes power, and the utility
company performs real-time power balancing and deficit
queue update:
– User-Power-Consumption: Each user consumes an
amount of power Ldn(n, k) + wn(k, t).
– Real-Time-Power-Purchasing-and-Deficit-Update:
The utility company procures power from the
real-time market if necessary, and updates the deficit
queues according to (15). 3
Note that to implement the WMA algorithm, the utility
company only has to use the instant value of market prices
(β(k), α¯(k)), and does not need to know their distribution.
This greatly simplifies the implementation of the algorithm
and makes it more robust.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of WMA. We
first have the following theorem, which states that the optimal
social welfare can be achieved by a stationary and randomized
algorithm Π∗ of the following structure: on any day k − 1,
the utility company observes the day-ahead and real-time
price vector (β(k), α¯(k)), and chooses the price vector i.i.d.
from some countable subset {(p(β,α¯)mt , t = 0, ..., T − 1),m =
1, ...,∞} of P according to some distribution {(a(β,α¯)mt , t =
0, ..., T − 1),m = 1, ...,∞}, both potentially depend on
(β(k), α¯(k)). Then, under any prices, the utility company
procures the base-power according to (11).
Theorem 1: The optimal system welfare Welfare∗av is given
by the following optimization problem.
Welfareav = sup
{
Utilityav − Costav} (25)
s.t. Utilityav = E
[ T−1∑
t=0
∞∑
m=1
a
(β,α¯)
mt
∑
n
E
[
Un(p
(β,α¯)
nmt , t)
]]
, (26)
Costav = E
[ T−1∑
t=0
∞∑
m=1
a
(β,α¯)
mt
∑
n
E
[
Cost(p(β,α¯)nmt , t)
]]
,(27)
TLavn ≤ E
[ T−1∑
t=0
∞∑
m=1
a
(β,α¯)
mt
∑
n
Ldn(p
(β,α¯)
nmt , t)
]
, ∀n,(28)
p
(β,α¯)
nmt = p
(β,α¯)
mt , ∀n,m, t, (29)
a
(β,α¯)
mt ≥ 0,
∞∑
m=1
a
(β,α¯)
mt = 1, ∀ t, (β, α¯), (30)
(p
(β,α¯)
nmt , t = 0, ..., T − 1) ∈ P, ∀ (β,α),m, n (31)
(p
(β,α¯)
mt , t = 0, ..., T − 1) ∈ P, ∀ (β,α),m. (32)
Here sup{} denotes the supremum. The outside expectations
are taken over the day-ahead and real-time price vectors
(β(k), α¯(k)). The inside expectations are taken over the user
usage variations wn(t). 3
Proof: The proof is done by using Caratheodory’s theo-
rem and is similar to [15]. Hence, the details are omitted for
brevity.
We see that the constraint (29) requires that the prices to
all the users are the same for all time. From this result, we
6get the following corollary, which characterizes the welfare
loss due to the equal price constraint, which we call price-of-
single-price, and denote as PoSP.
Corollary 1: Denote Welfarediffav the optimal social welfare
when the utility company’s prices can be set differently for
each individual user, and Welfarerav the optimal value of of
(25) without the constraint (29). Then, we have:
Welfarediffav = Welfare
r
av ≥Welfare∗av, (33)
and the price-of-linear-pricing is given by:
PoSP = Welfarerav −Welfare∗av.3 (34)
We can now present the performance results of the WMA
algorithm in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: (WMA with i.i.d. market prices) The average
welfare achieved by WMA with η = 1/ satisfies:
WelfareWMAav ≥Welfare∗av − C1T/η. (35)
Here C1 = T2
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2+[Lavn ]
2
)
is a constant independent
of η. Moreover, for all tk, k ≥ 0 and t, we have:
N∑
n=1
Qn(tk + t) ≤ δmaxNγ2η + T
∑
n
Lavn .3 (36)
We first see from Theorem 2 that the average welfare
achieved by WMA is within O() of the maximum. Thus,
as we decrease the value of  (or equivalently, increase the
value of η), we can push the average welfare to be arbitrarily
close to the maximum value. On the other hand, we also see
from (36) that the deficit queues are deterministically upper
bounded, implying that the users’ QoU will be guaranteed
with bounded deficit. Indeed, each user roughly has to defer
an aggregate load of δmaxγ2η + TLavn . This provides explicit
delay guarantees to the users, and is very useful in practice.
Note that the bound (36) is indeed a worst case upper bound.
As we will see in Section V, the actual average deficit queue
size can be much smaller.
Below we prove the queueing bound (36), the proof of (35)
will be presented in Appendix D.
Proof: (Theorem 2) To prove (36), we show that it holds
for every time tk, k ≥ 1, using induction. First, we see that it
holds for k = 1 because
∑
nQn(0) = 0 and it increases by at
most
∑
n L
av
n every time slot. Hence
∑
nQn(t1) ≤ T
∑
n L
av
n .
Now suppose (36) holds for k = 1, ...,K, we prove that it
also holds for k = K + 1.
(I) First, if
∑
nQn(tK) ≤ ηδmaxNγ2, then (36) holds for
tK+1. This is because the maximum increase of
∑
nQn(t)
over any day is T
∑
n L
av
n .
(II) Now suppose
∑
nQn(tK) > ηδmaxNγ
2. We will show
that the term E
[− ηCost(K, t) +∑nQn(tK + t)Ldn(k, t)] is
an increasing function of Ldn(K, t) for all t on day K. Thus,
WMA will encourage the users to consume more loads, which
will then reduce the deficit queue sizes. To do so, we first see
by Lemma 1 that:
E
[
ηCost(K, t)
] ≤ ηδmax∑
n
Ldn(K, t). (37)
Now we fix a user n∗ with load Ldn∗(K, t). If∑
nQn(tK)L
d
n(K, t) > ηδmaxNγ
2, we can use (3) to
get: ∑
n
Qn(tK)L
d
n(K, t) ≥
∑
n
Qn(tK)L
d
n∗(K, t)/γ
> ηδmaxNγ
2Ldn∗(K, t)/γ
> ηδmax
∑
n
Ldn(K, t). (38)
This shows that the term E
[ − ηCost(K, t) +∑
nQn(tK)L
d
n(K, t)
]
is increasing in Ldn(K, t) throughout
day K, which implies that the utility company will
set the price to 0, and the users will always chooses
Ldn(K, t) = L
d, max
n . Since L
d, max
n ≥ Lavn + wmaxn , the deficit
queue sizes will not further increase on day K. This shows
that
∑
nQn(tK) ≥
∑
nQn(tK+1), which by induction
completes the proof of (36).
Now we present the performance results of WMA under
more general market price processes.
Theorem 3: (WMA with Markov market prices) Suppose
(β(k), α¯(k)) evolves according to some finite state irreducible
and aperiodic Markov chain. Then, WMA with η = 1/
achieves:
WelfareWMAav ≥ Welfare∗av −O(), (39)
N∑
n=1
Qn(tk + t) ≤ δmaxNγ2η + T
∑
n
Lavn .3 (40)
Proof: (Theorem 3) First we see that the queueing bound
(40) can be proven using the exact same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 2. The performance bound (39) can be
proven using a multiple-slot drift argument developed in [17].
The details are omitted for brevity.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we present simulation results for the WMA
algorithm. In the simulation, we use T = 24 and consider
there are 2 users. Note that here each user can be viewed as
representing a class of consumers. We express the user load in
unit of 100MW. 7 We assume that Lminn (t) = 3 if t /∈ [9, 18],
and Lminn (t) = 5 if t ∈ [9, 18] for all users, and that Lmaxn = 12.
We assume that both users have the following utility function,
which have units of 1000 dollars per 100 MW:
Un(L, t) =

8L t ∈ [9, 18], L ≤ 5
0.8L+ 36 t ∈ [9, 18], L[5, 6]
4L+ 16.8, t ∈ [9, 18], L ∈ [6, 12],
amin(L, 6), t /∈ [9, 18], L ≤ 12.
(41)
Here a is tunable parameter which allows us to study how
the off-peak utility affects the social welfare. Since both users
have the same utility function, we have γ = 1. We note that the
utility functions for time slots in [9, 18] are non-concave. We
assume that the users have different QoU requirements, i.e.,
Lav1 = 4.5 and L
av
2 = 8. Thus, user 1 represents consumers that
are more flexible in power consumption, and are more willing
to shift their load. We also assume for simplicity that wn(t) =
0 for all t. Thus, each user consumes exactly the intended load.
The feasible price set is chosen to be P = [0, 800], which
7The number of users and the following per-user load parameters are chosen
to match the annual average hourly power demand of PG&E for the whole
year 2010, which is on the order of 4000 MW.
7corresponds to 0¢ to 8¢ per kWh, and is consistent with the
current electricity market prices.
We also use the following real-world data for market prices
and renewable energy.
Hourly market prices: We first compute 12 hourly price
data sets, for day-ahead and real-time market prices by averag-
ing the data of PG&E in the year 2010 (One for each month.
Data are from the CAISO daily report on the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) website [18]). Then, on each
day, we independently choose one price vector pair from the
12 data set uniformly at random. We convert the prices to
thousand dollars per 100MW.
Hourly renewable energy: We then compute the hourly
renewable available energy using the recorded wind power
of 100 wind turbines located near 40.42N, 124.39W at the
west coast in California in year 2006, which has an aggregate
capacity of 300MW (data from the National Renewable En-
ergy Laboratory (NREL) website [19]). For each hour, we first
average the values of the recorded wind power of that hour
(sampled every 10 minutes) to obtain 365 samples (normalized
to with unit 100MW). We then use the samples as the state
space and use the empirical distribution as its true distribution.
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Fig. 2. Average achieved welfare and average deficit queue size. The
off-peak utility coefficient a = 3.
We first simulate our algorithm with the off-peak utility
coefficient a = 3. The simulation results are plotted in
Fig. 2 and 3. We simulated WMA with both two pricing
schemes: same-price-for-all and one-price-for-each (Note that
in this case WMA will also converge to the corresponding
optimal when different prices are allowed). From the results,
we see that WMA efficiently improves the social welfare
while effectively controlling the QoU. For instance, in Fig. 2,
when η = 20, the social welfare (under the same-price-for-all
scheme) already reaches 19.6 thousand dollars per hour, which
is near-optimal. Also, the corresponding deficit is roughly 37,
which roughly corresponds to a 3 hour delay of the load,
because the average hourly load is 5+8 = 13. We note that our
deficit queueing bound (36) for η = 20 is 756. This suggests
that the actual average deficit queue size of WMA can be much
smaller than that in (36).
From the simulation results, we can also see how the pricing
scheme affects the social welfare. We see that this price
diversity not only allows us to improve the social welfare
by 2% (Fig. 2) to 9% (Fig. 3), but also results in a smaller
deficit (up to 41% saving in both cases). This is because
allowing different prices enables the system to better adapt to
the deficits, which ensures the QoU being met more quickly.
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Fig. 3. Average achieved welfare and average deficit queue size. The
off-peak utility coefficient a = 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem of jointly optimizing
power procurement and demand response to maximize social
welfare. We develop a low-complexity algorithm called the
welfare maximization algorithm (WMA), which is constructed
based on a two-timescale Lyapunov optimization technique.
We prove that WMA achieves a close-to-optimal utility and
ensures that the users’ average power usages meet their
requirements with bounded deficit. We also perform simulation
using real-world data and show that WMA effectively achieves
near-optimal social welfare.
APPENDIX A – PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Here we prove Lemma 1. We first recall the Cost(k, t)
function:
Cost(k, t) , β(k, t)B(k, t) + α(k, t)Y (k, t),
where the power deficit Y (t) is given by:
Y (k, t) =
[
L(k, t)−X(k, t)−B(k, t)]+
=
[
Ld(k, t)− Z(k, t)−B(k, t)]+. (42)
We now present the proof. For notation simplicity, we omit
the k, t indexes when it is clear.
Proof: (Lemma 1) First, it is clear that if α¯(k, t) =
E[α(k, t)] < β(k, t), then B∗(k, t) = 0. Now suppose
α¯(k, t) ≥ β(k, t). Using (42) and omitting the k, t indexes,
we have:
E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
= α¯
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Ld −B − z]+fZ(z, t)dz + βB
= α¯
∫ Ld−B
−∞
[
Ld −B − z]fZ(z, t)dz + βB. (43)
8It can be verified that E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
is convex in B. Thus, to
minimize it, we take the derivate to get:
dE
[
Cost
]
dB
= β + α¯
[− (Ld −B)fZ(Ld −B, t)]
−α¯
[
− (Ld −B)fZ(Ld −B, t)−
∫ Ld−B
−∞
fZ(z, t)dz
]
= β − α¯FZ(Ld −B, t). (44)
Setting (44) to zero, we obtain:
B∗ =
[
Ld − F−1Z (
β
α¯
, t)
]+
. (45)
This proves (11). To see (13), suppose B∗ > 0 and plug (45)
back into (43), we get:
E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
= βB + α¯(Ld −B)
∫ F−1Z ( βα¯ ,t)
−∞
fZ(z, t)dz(46)
−α¯
∫ F−1Z ( βα¯ ,t)
−∞
zfZ(z, t)dz
= βLd − α¯
∫ F−1Z ( βα¯ ,t)
−∞
zfZ(z, t)dz. (47)
Here the second equality uses the fact that∫ F−1Z ( βα¯ ,t)
−∞ fZ(z, t)dz = β/α¯. Finally, it can be seen
from (12) and (13) that E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
is non-decreasing in
Ldn(k, t). This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B – PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Here we prove Lemma 2.
Proof: (Lemma 2) Since w(t) is independent of X(t) and
has zero mean, it suffices to show that VoR(t) is increasing
with the mean of Z(t) and non-increasing with the variance
of Z(t). To begin, we note that Z(t) can be written as a sum
of a constant, which determines its mean, and a zero mean
random variable, i.e., (we drop the time indexes below for
convenience):
Z = µ+ σH. (48)
Here H has unit variance, zero mean, and a pdf fH(h). σ2 is
the variance of Z.
We first consider the case when B∗ ≥ 0. Recall (13):
VoR(t) = α¯
∫ F−1Z ( βα¯ )
−∞
zfZ(z)dz. (49)
Denote θ = F−1Z (
β
α¯ ), we can rewrite the above as:
VoR(t) = α¯
∫ θ
−∞
zfZ(z)dz
= α¯
∫ θ−µ
σ
−∞
(µ+ σh)fH(h)dh
= α¯
∫ θ−µ
σ
−∞
µfH(h)dh+ σα¯
∫ θ−µ
k
−∞
hfH(h)dh
= α¯µFH(
θ − µ
σ
) + σα¯
∫ θ−µ
σ
−∞
hfH(h)dh.
Now since FZ(θ) = βα¯ , we see that FH(
θ−µ
σ ) =
β
α¯ . Thus
θ−µ
σ = F
−1
H (
β
α¯ ). Denote θH = F
−1
H (
β
α¯ ), then we have:
VoR(t) = βµ+ σα¯
∫ θH
−∞
hfH(h)dh. (50)
Now since E
[
H
]
= 0, we see that
∫ θH
−∞ hfH(h)dh ≤ 0. Hence
VoR(t) is an increasing function of µ and a non-increasing
function of σ.
Now suppose B∗ = 0. In this case, we will show that
E
[
Cost(k, t)
]
is decreasing in µ and increasing in σ. To this
end, we have:
E
[
Cost
]
= α¯
∫ Ld
−∞
(Ld − z)fZ(z)dz
= α¯
∫ Ld−µ
σ
−∞
(Ld − µ− σh)fH(h)dh
= α¯(Ld − µ)
∫ Ld−µ
σ
−∞
fH(h)dh− α¯σ
∫ Ld−µ
σ
−∞
hfH(h)dh.
We can now take derivative with respect to µ to get:
∂E
[
Cost
]
dµ
= −α¯FH(L
d − µ
σ
) (51)
≤ 0.
This implies that E
[
Cost
]
is decreasing with µ. We can also
take a derivative with respect to σ to get:
∂E
[
Cost
]
dσ
= −α¯
∫ Ld−µ
σ
−∞
hfH(h)dh (52)
≥ 0.
In the last step, we have used the fact that E
[
H
]
= 0, thus∫ Ld−µ
σ
−∞ hfH(h)dh ≤ 0. We see that the function is increasing
with σ.
APPENDIX C – PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In this section, we prove Lemma 3.
Proof: (Lemma 3) Squaring both sides of the queueing
dynamic equation (15), we have:
[Qn(tk + t+ 1)]
2 ≤ [Qn(tk + t)]2 + [Ln(k, t)]2 + [Lavn ]2
−2Qn(k, t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
]
.
Multiplying both sides with 12 , using the fact that Ln(k, t) ≤
Lmaxn , and summing over all n, we have:
V (tk + t+ 1) ≤ V (tk + t) + 1
2
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
−
∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
]
.
Denote C = 12
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
. Summing over t =
0, ..., T −1 and taking expectations on both sides conditioning
on Q(tk), we get the following:
∆(tk) ≤ CT (53)
−
∑
t
E
[∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
] | Q(tk)].
This proves the lemma.
9APPENDIX D – PROOF OF (35) OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. To proceed, we
first have the following lemma, which shows that WMA
approximately minimizes (21).
Lemma 4: Let Φ∗ be the maximum value of Φ(p(k)) and
let pA(k) = (pA(k, t), t = 0, ..., T − 1) be the maximizers
of ΦA(p(k)) ,
∑T−1
τ=0 Φ
A(p(k, t)). Then ΦA(pA(k)) ≥ Φ∗ −
TC0, where C0 = (T − 1)
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
/2.
Proof: (Lemma 4) From (15), we have the following
inequalities:
Qn(tk + t) ≤ Qn(tk) + tLavn , Qn(tk + t) ≥ Qn(tk)− tLmaxn .
Using these inequalities, we have:
Qn(tk + t)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
]
(54)
≤ Qn(tk)
[
Ln(k, t)− Lavn
]
+ t
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
.
Then, by comparing Φ(p(k)) and ΦA(p(k)), we see that for
any p(k),
Φ(p(k)) ≤ ΦA(p(k)) +
T−1∑
t=0
t
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
= ΦA(p(k)) +
T (T − 1)
2
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
≤ ΦA(pA(k)) + T (T − 1)
2
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 + [Lavn ]
2
)
.
Since this holds for all p(k), it holds for the p(k) that maxi-
mizes Φ(p(k)). Thus, by defining C0 , (T−1)2
∑
n
(
[Lmaxn ]
2 +
[Lavn ]
2
)
, we see that Lemma 4 follows.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof: (Theorem 2) From Lemma 4 we see that WMA
minimizes the RHS of (20) to within TC0 of the minimum.
Thus we have the following inequality:
∆(tk)− ηE
[
WelfareWMA(k) | Q(tk)
]
(55)
≤ C1T − η
T−1∑
t=0
E
[ N∑
n=1
UAn (Ln(k, t))− CostA(k, t) | Q(tk)
]
−
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∑
n
Qn(tk + t)
[
LAn(k, t)− Lavn
] | Q(tk)].
Here C1 = C+C0 = T2
(
[Lmaxn ]
2+[Lavn ]
2
)
, and the superscript
A stands for any other alternative pricing policies, including
the optimal randomized and stationary policy Π∗ defined in
Theorem 1. Now plugging the policy Π∗ into the RHS of (55)
and using the fact that:
E
[
WelfareΠ
∗
(k)
]
= Welfare∗av, E
[
Ln(k, t)
]
≥ Lavn , ∀n, (56)
we immediately obtain:
∆(tk)− ηE
[
WelfareWMA(k) | Q(tk)
]
≤ C1T − ηWelfare∗av.
Note that in the above step, we have use the fact that the policy
Π∗ chooses actions purely as functions of the random system
prices, and is independent of the deficit queue sizes. Now
taking expectations on both sides over Q(tk) and carrying
out a telescoping sum over k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1, we get:
E
[
L(tK)− L(t0)
]
− η
K−1∑
k=0
E
[
WelfareWMA(k)
]
≤ KC1T −KηWelfare∗av.
Rearranging the terms, using the fact that L(t) ≥ 0 for all t,
and dividing both sides by ηK, we get:
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
E
[
WelfareWMA(k)
]
≥Welfare∗av −
C1T
η
+
E
[
L(t0)
]
Kη
.
Taking the lim inf as K →∞ and using the fact that L(t0) <
∞, we see that (35) follows.
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